




Abstract:  The permissibility of actions depends upon facts about the
flourishing  and  separateness  of  persons.  Persons  differ  from  other
creatures  in  having  the  task  of  discovering  for  themselves,  by
conjecture and refutation, what sort of life will fulfil them. Compulsory
slavery impermissibly prevents some persons from pursuing this task.
However,  many people  may conjecture  that  they are natural  slaves.
Some of these conjectures may turn out to be correct. In consequence,
voluntary slavery, in which one person welcomes the duty to fulfil all
the commands of another,  is permissible. Life-long voluntary slavery
contracts  are  impermissible  because  of  human fallibility;  but  fixed-
term slavery contracts should be legally enforceable. Each person has
the temporarily alienable moral right to direct her own life.
Keywords: Aristotle,  compulsory  slavery,  critical  rationality,
enforceable  slave  contracts,  essential  personal  task,  natural  slave,
voluntary slavery.
Resumen: la permisibilidad de las acciones depende del hecho acerca
del florecimiento y separación de las personas. Las personas difieren de
otras criaturas por tener la tarea de descubrir por sí mismas, mediante
conjetura y refutación, qué tipo de vida les resulta plena. La esclavitud
voluntaria evita inaceptablemente que algunas personas lleven a cabo
esta tarea. Sin embargo, muchas personas pueden conjeturar que son
esclavos por naturaleza. Algunas de estas conjeturas pueden resultar
correctas.  En consecuencia,  la  esclavitud voluntaria,  en la  que una
persona  acepta  el  deber  de  satisfacer  todos  los  deseos  de  otra,  es
permisible.  Los  contratos  de  esclavitud  voluntaria  de  por  vida  son
inaceptables a causa de la falibilidad humana; pero los contratos de
esclavitud  por  un  tiempo  determinado  deberían  ser  legalmente
1 My thanks to William Glod for comments and queries on an early draft, which
helped me to improve the paper substantially.
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reconocidos.  Cada  persona  tiene  el  derecho  moral  temporalmente
alienable de dirigir su propia vida.
Palabras  clave: Aristóteles,  esclavitud  voluntaria,  racionalidad  crítica,
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Introduction
n one important sense of the word ‘free,’ which is the sense employed
here, a free person is one who has the legal right to direct his own life.
As a consequence, he is legally entitled to use force, or to invoke the
force of the state or of an agent acting on his behalf, to prevent others
from interfering with his direction of his life. Kidnapping a person is a
clear-cut case of interfering with that person’s direction of his own life.
Reading a book of one’s own in one’s own home is a clear-cut case of not
interfering with another person’s direction of his own life. However, while
there  are  other  clear-cut  cases  on  each  side  of  the  boundary,  the
boundary is somewhat fuzzy. For example, does playing loud music in
one’s own home interfere with one’s neighbour’s direction of his own life
(if,  for  example,  he  needs  peace  to  study)?  However,  articulating  the
content of the right to direct one’s own life is a job for another paper, or a
book. An intuitive grasp of the notion will suffice for our purposes here.
I
In contrast to a free person, a slave is a person, x, for whom there is
another person (a slave-owner), y, who has the legal right to direct the life
of x. A compulsory slave is one who has been enslaved against his will. A
voluntary  slave  is  one  who  has  agreed to  become  a  slave  of  another
person; that is, someone, x, who has, with the consent of another, y, given
y the legal right to direct the life  of  x.  Contemporary philosophers are
unanimous that compulsory slavery is morally impermissible. However,
while most contemporary theorists think that voluntary slavery is morally
impermissible, there are some dissenters. Robert Nozick (1974, 331) and
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1990, 283-84) opine, though without argument,
that voluntary slavery is  morally  permissible.  Hillel  Steiner  (1994,  232
including footnotes  4 and  5) argues that the right to ‘self-ownership’ is,
like other rights, waivable, and it is possible that a person’s ends will best
be achieved by waiving his right to self-ownership and becoming a slave.
Steiner does not say what he thinks the relevant ends might be. Walter
Block (2003) and Stephen Kershnar (2003) defend the moral permissibility
of voluntary slavery on the ground that it can be a lesser evil in some
circumstances, for example, where a parent sells himself into slavery in
exchange for resources paid to his needy family which will enable them to
buy food or medical treatment, or where a prisoner chooses slavery in
preference  to  life  imprisonment  or  execution.  Such  arguments  are
controversial; I will not consider them here. Instead, I consider whether
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 4 (enero-junio 2014): 115-137
118 DANNY FREDERICK
the possibility that there are natural slaves makes some form of voluntary
slavery morally permissible.
To save  on words,  henceforth ‘permissible’  always means  morally
permissible.  Something  which  is  normally  permissible  may  be
impermissible in some exceptional circumstances in which it  generates
grave consequences; and something which is normally impermissible may
be permissible in some exceptional circumstances in which it is the only
way  to  avoid  grave  consequences  (how  grave  is  ‘grave’  depends  upon
context). Thus, all general statements of permissibility or impermissibility
must  be  understood  to  hold  ceteris  paribus  (see  my  forthcoming).
Throughout, when I speak of persons I should be understood to be talking
of normal adult humans. This is not to suggest that other humans are not
persons;  it  is  just  to  avoid  encumbering  the  discussion  with  profuse
qualifications.
In  section  I,  I  explain  what  voluntary  slavery  is  by  describing  a
paradigm of  it.  In section  II,  I  argue that it  is  possible that  there  are
natural slaves of at least five different types. In section III, I explain how
persons  differ  from  other  creatures  and  how  the  human  predicament
grounds an alienable right of each person to direct his own life, which
makes  compulsory  slavery  impermissible  and  a  non-paradigm form of
voluntary slavery permissible. In section IV, I conclude.
I. Voluntary Slavery
A common confusion about slavery is exhibited by Steiner:
[S]elf-enslavement…cannot be incurred by a self-owner’s transferring (selling or
donating)  that  right  [of  self-ownership],  since  such  transfers  entail  that
transferrors  thereby  acquire  duties  to  their  transferees,  whereas  slaves,  as
things wholly owned by others, must lack duties as well as rights (1994, 232
footnote 4).
However,  slavery  is  essentially  a  relationship  between persons:  a
mere thing, or even a living non-person such as a cat, cannot literally be a
slave. A person is a moral agent with the duties to respect the rights of
others that all moral agents have. A slave cannot, therefore, lack duties.
On the assumption that  compulsory slavery is wrong, one might wonder
what duties a compulsory slave can have to her slave-owner; but even a
compulsory slave has duties to other people. In all societies which had an
institution of compulsory slavery, slaves were held responsible for their
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actions  and  punished  for  committing  crimes  (Patterson  1982,  196).
Steiner’s error is to take a metaphor literally. A slave is in some ways
analogous to a mere thing that is owned; but to be analogous to a mere
thing is not to be a mere thing. If a slave, who is essentially a person, had
to be a mere thing, a non-person, then slavery would be metaphysically
impossible and there could never have been any slavery in the world.2
Voluntary  slavery  is  slavery  by  agreement.  Various  types  of
relationship might aptly be described in that way, but it seems that the
paradigmatic  type  would  be  a  legally  recognised  agreement  along  the
following lines. One free person, x, makes a legally binding contract with
another free person, y, that, from some specified future time,
(a) x has the legal duty henceforward to fulfil all the commands of y;
(b) x cannot release x from that duty;
(c) y can release x from that duty;
(d) y may legally use or hire force to compel x to fulfil the commands
of y.
From the specified future time, the person,  x,  ceases to have the
legal right to direct her own life; she instead becomes a slave to her slave-
owner, y, whose commands x has a legal duty to obey, which gives y the
legal right to direct the life of x. It may help to clarify this arrangement if
we compare and contrast it with employment.
With  regard  to  (a),  in  both  voluntary  slavery  and  a  contract  of
employment,  one  person  accepts  the  duty  to  fulfil  the  commands  of
another: the employer or the slave-owner is responsible for directing the
employee or the slave; and the employee or the slave is responsible for
executing the directions appropriately. However, in employment this holds
only during working hours, and only with respect to commands which are
both  consistent  with  organisation  policies  and  relevant  to  the  job  as
specified in the job description. In voluntary slavery, there are no such
restrictions:  the slave  has no rights against the  slave-owner.  However,
there are some restrictions on an employer’s  control  over an employee
which also apply to a slave-owner with regard to a slave. For example,
becoming  an employer  or  an employee  does  not  give  one  authority  to
break the law, so it does not give the employer authority to command an
employee to break the law and it does not divest the employee of her legal
2 This sort of confusion goes back at least to Rousseau (1762, book I, ch. iv, 10) and
occurs  in  Ellerman’s  (2010)  objections  to  employment  and  Gabriel’s  (2012)
objections to professional soldiers.
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duty to obey the law. The same applies to becoming a slave-owner or a
slave. Any command to break the law is legally void, and the slave has a
legal duty not to fulfil it.
In connection with (b), although an employee accepts the duty to
fulfil  the commands of her employer, she can release herself from this
duty at any time by leaving the job. The employment contract normally
specifies a notice period; but the employee may refuse to work her notice,
though she may then be liable to pay compensation to her ex-employer.
The slave, in contrast, cannot release herself from her duty to fulfil the
commands of her slave-owner; otherwise it would simply not be slavery.
In connection with (c), while an employer must give an employee notice of
termination, and may also have to satisfy some other legal requirements,
before she can terminate an employee’s employment, a slave-owner can
release the slave from her slavery immediately.  With respect to (d),  an
employer may not legally use force to compel an employee to perform her
duties. The employment contract is enforceable against the employee only
in the sense that, if  the employee defaults on her duties, the employer
may terminate the relationship and may in some circumstances be able to
exact  financial  compensation for  damage or  loss.  In contrast,  a  slave-
owner is legally entitled to use or hire force to compel the slave to fulfil the
slave-owner’s commands, and to restrain or recapture a slave who tries to
get free of the relationship. In paradigmatic slavery there are no limits to
the severity of the force that a slave-owner may employ against her slave;
in consequence, the slave-owner is legally entitled to kill the slave.
A legally binding contract normally requires consideration on both
sides.  To  meet  this  condition,  the  prospective  slave-owner  must  make
some kind of payment for the services to be received from the prospective
slave. A contract for slavery is made at a time when the two parties to it
are  free  persons  who  thereby  acquire  contractual  obligations  to  each
other; but the contract stipulates a later time at which one of the parties
ceases to be free and becomes a slave, and the other party ceases to have
any obligations, contractual or otherwise, to the slave. Consequently, in a
slave contract, the contractual duties of the party who becomes the slave-
owner  must  be  completed  before  the  other  party  becomes  a  slave.  If
payment for the slave is made to the prospective slave, the latter must
consume or transfer this payment before the slavery begins, otherwise the
slave-owner could command the slave to hand it back; if payment is made
to a third-party beneficiary, the payment must be made before the slavery
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begins, otherwise the slave-owner’s obligation to the slave to make the
payment would lapse.
A  legally  binding  agreement  normally  requires  the  absence  of
coercion.  It  might  be  suggested  that  only  coercion  or  coercive
circumstances could explain a person’s consent to slavery. I argue against
that suggestion in the next section.
II. Natural Slavery
Aristotle claimed that some humans are natural slaves while others are
natural slave-owners (2007, I, iv,  v),  and that the latter are entitled to
enslave the former against their will (2007, I, xiii). Aristotle thought that
this  difference  in  moral  entitlement  depends  upon  a  difference  in
psychological capacities: ‘he who participates in rational principle enough
to apprehend,  but not to have, such a principle,  is  a slave by nature’
(2007, I, v). It appears that what Aristotle meant by this was that, while
the natural slave is capable of practical reasoning, he is not capable of
competent moral reasoning; so, left to himself, he will often act in a way
that even he later sees to be amiss (Heath 2008, 244-53). Thus, although
he is enslaved for the slave-owner’s benefit, a natural slave is better off
being enslaved (2007, I, ii, iv, v, xiii; 2006, VIII, x). Aristotle thought that
non-Greeks, the majority of humans, are natural slaves (2007, I, ii, vi; III,
xiv).
Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery is defective. First, there seems to
be no pronounced contrast between Greeks and non-Greeks with respect
to the capacity for competent moral reasoning. Second, it does not follow
from the fact that a person is incapable of  competent moral reasoning
that  the  person would  be  better  off  as  a  slave.  A person might  live  a
better, more fulfilling, life by directing his life less than competently than
he would live by being a permanent drudge on twenty-four-hour call to
another person. Still, Aristotle may have been right that there are some
people  who  are  incapable  of  living  well  if  left  to  decide  things  for
themselves; though the reasons may be unconnected with a deficiency in
reasoning capacity. Let us say that a natural slave is a person who is such
that the most fulfilling and worthwhile life that he can lead is one in which
he is  a slave to  another person.  I  do not know whether there are any
natural slaves; but it does seem possible that there are. I show this by
describing five types of person who would find fulfilment in being a slave.
For  each  type  I  point  to  familiar  kinds  of  actual  people  who  exhibit
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tendencies toward that type. These tendencies are stronger in some people
than they are in others. Indeed, it  seems possible that there are some
people in whom the tendencies are so pronounced and pervasive that they
would find fulfilment in being a slave. The following fivefold categorisation
of natural slaves is neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
The  dutiful  slave derives  fulfilment  from  being  under  another
person's total control. His satisfaction comes from being at the service of
another. He wants to take on the duty to serve another completely and to
discharge that duty in an exemplary manner. He takes pride in his service
and even in his subservience; indeed, his self-respect depends upon doing
these things well. He is not incapable of directing his own life; but a life of
subservience is more valuable to him. Indeed, he might even supervise
others on his slave-owner’s behalf, in which case even these exercises of
dominance will be suffused by his submission to his owner. A tendency to
dutiful  slavery  often  finds  expression  in  religion.  St.  Paul  says  that
Christians  are  slaves  to  obedience  (Romans  6:16)  and  slaves  to  God
(Romans 6:22).  That  is  a  metaphor;  but  it  seems that  many religious
people have wanted to take it  literally. If  natural slaves exist,  it  seems
likely  that  some of  them will  be  found in monasteries,  nunneries  and
cults. Similarly, though perhaps to a lesser extent, the tendency to dutiful
slavery  seems  to  be  exhibited  by  some  who  join  the  armed  forces  or
domestic service. A fictional example, which will be true to life in some
respects,  is  Stevens  the  butler,  in  The  Remains  of  the  Day,  whose
fulfilment comes from service to a gentleman of  moral worth.  He is in
charge of seventeen staff and carries out his duties stoically whatever the
circumstances, striving for a ‘dignity in keeping with his position’ which is
worthy of the admiration even of the gentry (Ishiguro 1989).
The weak-willed slave yearns to be a dutiful slave who fulfils every
command of  his superior;  but  he knows that in practice  he will  often
default  on  his  duties  because  of  his  lackadaisical  nature.  The  most
worthwhile life he can lead is as a slave to a slave-owner who will not only
command but also exhort and punish, to goad him into doing his duty, or
as much of his duty as he can do. He knows that if he has the option of
terminating his servitude, he will do so when the going gets tough and
thereby forsake his fulfilment, so it is essential for him that he is a slave
rather than just a servant. If dutiful slaves are possible then so are weak-
willed  slaves.  They  are  analogous  to  someone  who  submits  to  a
detoxification programme during which his  pleas  for  drugs,  alcohol  or
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tobacco will be ignored and his attempts to escape will be frustrated. The
weak-willed slave’s self-respect is fragile, not because he lives as a slave,
but because he often falls short of his slave duties and disappoints his
slave-owner.
The refractory slave, unlike the previous two types, avows no duty to
obey his slave-owner. When he complies with his owner’s instructions, he
does so to avoid punishment or for some ulterior motive. Although the
slave-owner has the legal right to control him, the slave denies this. He
acknowledges  that  he  is  kept  in  slavery  but  he  deems  this  situation
unjust  and he  recurrently  rebels  against  the  slave-owner.  There  is  an
element of fiction here, if he is a voluntary slave, because he has given the
slave-owner the right to control him. But the fiction is necessary for him
because he finds his fulfilment in rebellion and his self-respect comes
from resisting an oppressor (just as his owner may find his fulfilment in
subduing refractory slaves or, at least, in attempting to subdue them, for
the  chase  may  be  better  than  the  catch).  For  slaves  of  this  type,  if
oppressors do not exist, they have to invent them (to adapt Voltaire). The
tendency to this type of  slavery is  commonly exhibited in political  life,
where  the  scene  is  littered  with  people  striking  revolutionary  poses
against all manner of more or less imaginary oppressors (evil conspiracies
of various kinds) or looking for a reason to martyr themselves.
The anxious slave may be  competent  to  make good decisions for
himself but he thinks, correctly, that the disadvantages of the anxiety he
suffers  in  making  choices  outweigh  the  advantages  of  making  good
choices.  It  therefore  makes  sense  for  him to  hand  over  the  decision-
making to someone else, even though the choices will be poorer, perhaps
even much poorer, simply in order to be disburdened of the anxiety that
he finds unendurable. He will want a reasonably virtuous slave-owner, to
avoid having to cope with the dilemma of a command to break the law. He
suffers  from  ‘the  strain  of  civilisation’  (Karl  Popper’s  phrase).  He  just
wants to be told what to do, so that he does not have to think for himself.
The  tendency  to  this  form  of  slavery  is  evident  in  the  widespread
attraction to tribalism (Popper 1945, chapter 10).
The  masochistic  slave finds his  fulfilment  in  pain,  humiliation or
other torment. He could be a slave of any of the preceding types, but he
needs a slave-owner who is sadistic. Some slaves of this type might find
self-respect in bearing the suffering they endure. But for others a loss of
self-respect may be an important part of the suffering. Indeed, some may
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 4 (enero-junio 2014): 115-137
124 DANNY FREDERICK
accept the duty to obey the slave-owner because they recognise that it
demeans them. Some refractory slaves,  who avow no duty to obey the
slave-owner,  may  derive  satisfaction  from the  humiliation  they  feel  in
submitting to the slave-owner’s demands. The tendency to this form of
slavery  is  commonplace  and is  exhibited in  sadomasochistic  practices,
lifestyles and media.
Thus, tendencies to each of these types of natural slavery appear to
be common. I conjecture that a tendency to natural slavery exists in each
of us to some degree, and that evolutionary biology may be able to provide
an explanation for it. Indeed, the elements of such an explanation may
already  exist,  since  Christopher  Boehm  (1999)  describes  our  natural
proclivity for dominance hierarchies, and Joseph Henrich and Francisco
Gil-White (2001) offer an account of the evolution of voluntary deference.
Since  the  tendency  toward  one  or  another  kind  of  natural  slavery  is
stronger in some people than in others, we cannot rule out the possibility
that there will be people in whom the tendency is so strong as to make
them natural slaves, people whose vocation was expressed by Bersyenev:
‘I feel that one’s whole destiny in life should be to make oneself number
two’ (Turgenev 1859, 30).
The possibility of natural slave-owners seems easier to explain. Let
us say that a natural slave-owner is a person whose flourishing would be
enhanced if he were a slave-owner. We all have chores which a slave could
do for us, thereby permitting us to spend much more of our time and
energy on more satisfying activities. So long as we would not find directing
a  natural  slave  so  irksome  that  it  outweighed  those  benefits,  our
flourishing would be enhanced by being a slave-owner.  Further,  many
people find managing others intrinsically fulfilling, so for some of those
people directing the life of  a slave could be a substantial  part  of  their
fulfilment.  It  seems  not  only  possible  but  highly  likely  that  there  are
natural slave-owners, as well as people with tendencies to be such. Many
marriages  and  friendships  appear  to  resemble,  to  a  greater  or  lesser
extent, one or more of the types of slavery outlined above.
This  account  of  natural  slavery  assumes  that  some  activities  or
forms  of  life  are  objectively  valuable  for  some  people;  but  a  value
subjectivist or anti-realist might reformulate it in terms of preferences.
III. Permissible Slavery
In the case of an animal which is not a person, the best life that it can
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lead is determined by its biology; and the animal normally tries to live a
life of that kind by acting in accord with its biological instincts and the
culture, if any, that it acquires from its local conspecifics. In contrast, a
person  is  a  creature  who  has  language  and  self-consciousness.  That
enables  a  person to  formulate  in  words  her  beliefs,  thoughts,  desires,
expectations,  emotions  and  such  like.  Once  a  person  objectifies  the
contents of  her  subjective states in this way,  she can distance herself
from them,  view them sceptically,  consider  alternatives,  and formulate
critical arguments and tests to decide between alternatives (Popper and
Eccles 1977, 57-59, 108-12, 144-46). This capacity for critical rationality
enables  a  person  not  only  to  evaluate  ways  of  living  exemplified  by
existing persons (including herself), but also to discover new possibilities.
The sort of life that a human person will find fulfilling will be related to
that human’s biology, but the exercise of critical rationality can make that
relation tortuously indirect. For example, people today can live sorts of
lives that would have been inconceivable or thought physically impossible
a few centuries ago, such as an astronaut, a transsexual model, a genetic
engineer, or a web-site designer. Some people find their fulfilment in living
lives  of  these  new  kinds,  while  others  find  fulfilment  in  living  more
traditional types of lives. Therefore, unlike those animals which are not
persons, a person is faced with the question: what sort of life will be most
fulfilling for me?
There is an abundance of material which is relevant to answering
that  question.  There  are  studies  by  psychologists,  anthropologists  and
other  social  scientists concerning  different  ways  of  life.  There  are
biographies,  autobiographies,  novels  and  dramas,  as  well  as  lifestyle
discussions throughout the popular media, containing accounts of how
different people have fared in different kinds of life. However, what suits
some people does not suit others, so the person also needs to know about
herself.  She  may  be  able  to  learn  about  herself  from  family,  friends,
teachers and other acquaintances, since other people sometimes know a
person better than she knows herself, in at least some respects. However,
while  such  research  will  enable  the  person  to  form some  conjectures
about the sort of life she will find fulfilling, those conjectures need to be
tested. Even if another person’s knowledge of the sort of life that will fulfil
a specific person is better than the knowledge that the person has herself,
the other person’s knowledge is still conjectural and needs to be put to
the test. The crucial test of whether a type of life will fulfil a person is that
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person’s own experience of living that type of life. This is especially so if
the kind of life she conjectures will fulfil her is one that no one has lived
before. Therefore, in order to answer the question of how to live, a person
has to form a hypothesis about what type of life will fulfil her, and then
test  that  hypothesis  by  living  that  type  of  life,  or  at  least  some
approximation to it. If she finds that the life she has chosen does not fulfil
her, her hypothesis is refuted. If she is to find an answer to her question,
her next steps must be to try to learn from her mistake, think up another
theory about who she is and then, insofar as she can extricate herself
from the circumstances of her current life, set out to test that new theory.
The  essential  personal  task of  each  person  is  to  discover  for  herself,
through conjecture  and refutation,  what  sort  of  life  will  constitute  her
fulfilment.  (This  is  not  to  suggest  that  every  person  apprehends  her
essential  personal  task and  attempts  to  pursue  it:  for  example,  some
people just follow convention or drift from one lifestyle to another under
the influence of circumstances.)
A natural slave is a person whose most fulfilling and worthwhile life
is one in which she is a slave to another person. If there are any natural
slaves, what is good for them is slavery; it is through slavery that they will
realise  themselves  and  flourish.  It  is  possible  that  there  are  natural
slaves.  Further,  tendencies  to  natural  slavery  are  endemic;  so,  many
people may conjecture that they are natural slaves. None of these people
can discover  whether  they  are  natural  slaves  except  by  experimenting
with slavery, or some approximation to it. If they are to accomplish their
essential  personal  task,  they  must  have  the  opportunity  for  such
experiments. If they thereby discover that they are natural slaves, their
fulfilment depends upon them choosing slavery for themselves. Therefore,
voluntary slavery is permissible. That is a sketch of the argument that will
be developed in the rest of this section.
Few,  if  any,  theorists  would  deny  that  morality  is  centrally
concerned  with  the  flourishing  of  persons.  Given  the  nature  of  the
essential personal task, human flourishing can be achieved only if people
are able to try out ‘experiments in living’ (a term from John Stuart Mill,
1859), subject to the proviso that such experiments do not undermine the
flourishing of others. The interconnectedness of people in society means
that almost every such experiment by one person will have some adverse
impact on some other people, so it  is only where its adverse impact is
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substantial that a specific experiment is impermissible.3 For instance, a
man may conjecture that he will find his fulfilment in driving on busy
roads  while  he  is  drunk;  but  it  is  impermissible  for  him to  test  that
conjecture by living it because the threat to the flourishing of others is too
great. However, there is a limit to the permissible trade-offs between the
flourishing of  one person and that of  others. Most theorists insist that
morality  is  centrally  concerned  with  respect  for  the  separateness  of
persons (see Zwolinski 2008 for useful discussion): a standard objection
to act-utilitarianism and some other consequentialist theories is that they
fail to take account of this separateness. We can illustrate the point with
one  of  Thomson’s  examples  (1990,  135).  An  expert  surgeon  has  five
patients who will die if they do not get new parts: two need one lung each,
two need one kidney each, and one needs a heart. A healthy young man
who is visiting the hospital has the right blood type and can be cut up to
supply the parts for the five patients. The surgeon asks the young man
whether he would like to volunteer his parts; but the young man declines.
If the surgeon nevertheless kills the young man and cuts him up, this
will,  let  us  assume,  enable  five  people  to  flourish  at  the  cost  of  the
flourishing of only one person. However, despite the net gain for human
flourishing  from  curtailing  the  young  man’s  experiment  in  living,  the
surgeon’s action is impermissible because it uses the young man simply
as a means to the flourishing of others.
We must pause a moment to consider what it means to use someone
simply as a means. Kant (1785, 4: 429-30) says that it is permissible to
use a person as a means where she shares the end of the action. This
suggests that she must  consent to be used as a means with a view to
some  potential benefit for herself. For example, when I hire a plumber I
use her as a means to the end of getting my leaking pipe fixed; but I do
not use her simply as a means because she agrees to fix my pipe in return
for a payment. It is not necessary that she actually derives some benefit
from  the  transaction:  the  trial-and-error  nature  of  our  search  for
fulfilment means that we will often make mistakes about which actions
are beneficial. However, it does seem that conjectured potential benefit is
necessary.  For  example,  suppose  the  young  man  in  the  transplant
example had consented to be cut up for the sake of the other five people.
Would that have made it permissible for the surgeon to proceed? Some of
3 The notion of a substantial adverse impact needs to be spelt out carefully; but we
do not need to address that issue here.
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us may think not, because we cannot see what is in it for the young man.
However,  if  we could  see  how,  given the facts  about  his  life,  it  would
enhance his  flourishing to make that  sacrifice,  we may think that his
consent then makes it permissible for the surgeon to proceed. It seems,
though, that it must be possible that the conjectured potential benefit will
arise. For example, if the young man agrees to the transplants because he
mistakenly believes that, as a reward for his altruism, his body will grow
replacement  organs  that  will  be  better  than  the  original  ones,  then it
would be impermissible for the surgeon to proceed.
It also seems that consent is necessary. For example, even if I am
convinced that the plumber’s flourishing will be enhanced if she fixes my
pipe for a payment, it is not permissible for me to compel her to fix my
pipe, even if I pay her handsomely, and even if it turns out in fact that the
experience and the payment are genuinely beneficial for her. How can we
explain this? Here is my attempt. Let us consider two arbitrarily chosen
people whom we can label ‘Alf’ and ‘Betty.’ No one can know for sure what
will benefit another person. So even where Betty knows better than Alf
what is  good for Alf,  it  may still  turn out that both Betty and Alf  are
mistaken and that Alf  learns more from his mistaken experiment than
Betty could ever teach him. Further, it is not the case that everyone who
thinks she knows better actually does know better. Indeed, in the sorts of
cases we are considering, in which Betty wants to use Alf as a means to
the flourishing of Betty, it will be almost inevitable that self-interest will
give Betty a jaundiced view of what will be good for Alf. As a consequence,
if Betty were to use Alf as a means whenever Betty thought that Alf would
benefit, Alf would often have his flourishing undermined. It must be Alf
who conjectures that there is a potential benefit for him, and also that the
potential benefit is greater than that obtainable from alternative courses
of action open to him. The test of that is that he consents. It is therefore
impermissible to use a person as a means to the flourishing of others
without that person’s consent.
We can summarise the preceding discussion in the following (not
very precise) principles:
(i)  it is permissible for a person to try out whatever kind of life she
conjectures  may fulfil  her,  if  such experimentation on her  part  is  not
impermissible according to (ii) or (iii);
(ii) it is impermissible to use a person as a means to the flourishing
of some others, unless
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 the person agrees to be so used because she conjectures
that there is a potential benefit for her, and
 it is possible that a person should obtain the conjectured
benefit from being so used;
(iii) it is impermissible for a person to experiment with a kind of life
she  conjectures  may  fulfil  her,  if  doing  so  has  a  substantial  adverse
impact on the flourishing of others.
There seems to be general, though not universal, agreement that if
we could save, say, a million or a billion people by killing just one, that
would  be  an  increase  in  overall  flourishing  sufficient  to  make  it
permissible to use the one as a means to the flourishing of the others
without the one’s consent. That is consistent with (ii) because the implicit
ceteris-paribus  clause  in  all  general  statements  of  permissibility  and
impermissibility allows for exceptions (though it need not commit us to
accepting this particular type of exception, since there is room for debate
about exactly when other things are not equal). It does not follow from (i)
that any kind of experimentation is permissible if it is not impermissible
according  to  (ii)  and  (iii),  because  (i)  concerns  only  experimentation
conducted by a person to test conjectures about what kind of life will fulfil
her.  It  does  follow  immediately  from  (ii)  that  compulsory  slavery  is
impermissible, because the slave-owner uses the slave as a means to the
flourishing of  the slave-owner without the slave’s  consent.  I  now show
that principles (i) - (iii) make one kind of voluntary slavery permissible.
Slavery is  a  relationship  between  two  people;  so,  for  voluntary
slavery to be permissible, it must not only be permissible for a person to
be a slave, it must also be permissible for a person to be a slave-owner
(Vallentyne 2000, 3-4). Compare: it is permissible for Jane to marry, but
there are no eligible bachelors. We have seen that there are widespread
tendencies to slavery and to slave-ownership. Consequently, many people
may conjecture that they are natural slaves and many may conjecture
that they are natural slave-owners. From (i) it follows that it is permissible
for those people to try out slavery or slave-ownership, respectively, if such
experimentation on their part is not impermissible according to (ii) or (iii).
If two such people agree to experiment with a relationship in which one is
slave-owner  and  the  other  slave,  each  in  order  to  further  her  own
flourishing, the possibility that there are natural slaves and natural slave-
owners  means  that  such  an  experiment  in  voluntary  slavery  is  not
impermissible  according  to  (ii).  Each  uses  the  other  as  a  means  to
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discovering  what  sort  of  life  will  fulfil  her,  but  neither  uses  the  other
simply  as  a  means.  It  has  been  argued  that  voluntary  slavery  would
generate costs or  harms for people outside  of  the slavery  relationship,
since the costs of monitoring or enforcing slavery agreements would be
borne by the  public,  and third parties  may suffer  distress,  or  become
insensitive to suffering,  if  they are aware of  the existence of  voluntary
slaves  (Feinberg  1986,  75-81).  However,  the  costs  of  monitoring  or
enforcing slavery contracts can be charged to the people who participate
in them (see below). Further, interracial affection may generate distress in
some third parties, and the promotion of political ideas like nationalism
may reduce some people’s sensitivity to the suffering of others, but such
third-party effects are not considered substantial enough to make those
activities  impermissible.  Therefore,  (iii)  does  not  render  experiments  in
voluntary slavery impermissible (see Archard 1990,  456,  and Kershnar
2003,  part  II,  section  B,  for  further  discussion).  Consequently,  it  is
permissible  for  some  people  to  experiment  with  voluntary  slavery  and
voluntary slave-ownership.
The conclusion that it is permissible for some people to experiment
with voluntary slavery falls short of the conclusion that voluntary slavery
is permissible, because experiments typically come to an end. Someone
who  has  experimented  with  voluntary  slavery,  or  something
approximating it, and has found the life fulfilling, might conclude that she
is a natural slave. However, it is not possible for her to know for certain
that she is a natural slave. The fact that she has found a life of slavery, or
something  close  to  it,  fulfilling  so  far,  does  not  preclude  her  from
discovering in future that it ceases to fulfil her, either because there is
only so much of such a life that she can enjoy, or because she changes
over time. Someone who finds slavery fulfilling at a younger age may find
it  unbearable  at  a  later  age.  However,  voluntary  slavery  in  its
paradigmatic form does not permit the slave to terminate her relationship
with her slave-owner. She may appeal to her slave-owner to release her,
but the slave-owner may refuse. She may then find herself trapped in an
unfulfilling,  probably  intolerable,  form of  life  for  the  rest  of  her  days.
Consequently, if paradigmatic voluntary slavery is permitted, many people
(perhaps all)  who enter voluntary slavery  may eventually discover  that
they have made a terrible mistake which they are unable to correct. Their
continued slavery enables their slave-owners to continue to experiment
with  a  kind  of  life  that  they  conjecture  may  fulfil  them,  but  only  by
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prevented the  slaves  from  finding  fulfilment.  That  is  impermissible
according to (iii). Therefore, voluntary slavery in its paradigmatic form is
impermissible.
It may seem that the trouble with paradigmatic voluntary slavery is
its condition (b), according to which the slave cannot release herself from
the duty to follow the commands of her slave-owner. However, if the slave
can release herself from that duty, the slave-owner cannot enforce it, so if
condition (b)  goes,  so  does  condition (d),  which means that  the  slave-
owner  can  do  only  that  to  which  the  slave  willingly  submits.  Such a
relationship would not count as slavery at all; nor would it fulfil a natural
slave. Even a dutiful slave who never wants to terminate the relationship
and who willingly submits to all the slave-owner’s demands and abuses
may find her slavery ersatz if she knows that she can pull out of it at any
time and that her owner is constrained by that consideration. The weak-
willed  slave  and  the  refractory  slave  would  be  unable  to  realise
themselves,  for  each  needs  an  arrangement  in  which  she  is  forcibly
restrained from ending  her  slavery  and compelled to  do things she is
disinclined to do. The anxious slave, somewhat similarly,  will  find it  a
great  relief  to  be  spared any  agonising  over  whether  to  terminate  the
slavery.  The masochistic  slave  may be denied her peculiar  satisfaction
because the slave-owner is reluctant to punish her severely for fear that
she might end the relationship. Indeed, all types of slave may be denied
the more extreme forms of treatment, which they may need. Therefore, a
relationship  without  condition  (b)  would  not  be  fulfilling  for  natural
slaves; it would be just play-acting at slavery.
However, there is a non-paradigmatic form of voluntary slavery the
permissibility of which is consistent with (ii) and (iii) and which also has
the following benefits:
 it  allows  people  the  opportunity  to  experiment  with
something approximating paradigmatic slavery,
 it permits people who are convinced that they are natural
slaves  to  live  their  lives  in  a  state  that  approximates
paradigmatic slavery.
We  obtain  this  form  of  non-paradigmatic  slavery  if  we  amend
condition (a) of paradigmatic voluntary slavery by replacing ‘henceforward’
with ‘until the end of the contract period.’ For, a fixed-term contract will
enable people to experiment with a good approximation to slavery for a
limited time, so that they can test whether they are natural slaves; and it
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will enable people who are convinced that they are natural slaves to renew
the contract as soon as it expires. The term of the contract can be agreed
by the parties, up to a period of, say, five years. Such voluntary slavery is
non-paradigmatic for two reasons. First,  although the contract may be
terminated at any time by the slave-owner, the contract terminates at the
end of the fixed term independently of the slave-owner’s wishes. Second,
this  fact  is  likely  to  inhibit  somewhat  the  slave-owner  who wants  the
relationship to continue beyond the end of the fixed term: she may be
wary of being too severe in case the slave does not renew the contract. So
the time-limited nature of the contract makes it significantly weaker than
paradigmatic voluntary slavery.
It is, though, the time-limited nature of the contract that makes it
permissible. Fixed-term voluntary slavery is consistent with (ii) because
slave-owner  and  slave  have  agreed  to  the  contract,  each  in  order  to
further her essential personal task; and it is possible that there are people
who are fulfilled by slave-ownership and slavery, respectively. It is also
consistent with (iii), because a slave in such a relationship who discovers
that she is not a natural slave will be able to resume her experimentation
with other kinds of life at the end of the contract period, or sooner if her
slave-owner releases her. Of course, she might not be able to resume her
experimentation as soon as she concludes that she is not a natural slave.
In  such  cases,  there  will  be  some  adverse  impact  on  her  flourishing
because she will be preventing from pursuing her essential personal task
for a time. However, it will be only for a relatively short period; and this
drawback  is  unavoidable  if  people  are  permitted  to  experiment  with
slavery, which is in turn necessary if natural slaves are to live fulfilling
lives and if people who mistakenly think that they may be natural slaves
are  to  pursue  their  search  for  fulfilment  and  obtain  information  that
improves their chances of finding fulfilment in the future.
In  paradigmatic  voluntary  slavery,  the  slave-owner  is  entitled  to
acquire the slave’s property and to kill the slave. The former entitlement
will attract people looking for a ‘licence to rob,’ who want to take on a
slave, acquire her property and then immediately release her from slavery;
while  the second entitlement will  attract  people,  such as serial  killers,
who see it  as a ‘licence to kill.’  In both sorts of  case,  the slave-owner
would  be  using  the  slave  simply  as  a  means  to  enhance  her  own
flourishing. This is impermissible according to (ii): the prospective slave
has not agreed to be used as the prospective slave-owner intends to use
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her. The prospective slave-owner is attempting a kind of fraud and is not
a  permissible  slave-owner.  Thus,  fixed-term  voluntary  slavery  will  be
permissible  only  if  such people  are  excluded from being  slave-owners.
This can be achieved by making two further departures from paradigmatic
voluntary  slavery.  First,  in  permissible  fixed-term  slave  contracts,  the
slave-owner will have a duty not to kill the slave. Since the slave-owner
can have no duties to the slave, the duty not to kill the slave must be a
matter  of  the  criminal  law,  and  it  will  permit  the  exceptions  that  are
generally  recognised  in  that  law,  such  as  self-defence,  and  perhaps
assisted  suicide.  Second,  the  slave  will  be  required  to  give  away  her
property before the start of the contract term. Although each of these two
conditions  moves  fixed-term  slavery  further  away  from  paradigmatic
voluntary slavery, it seems that neither makes an essential difference to
the relationship. After all, a genuine slave-owner wants a live slave. Even
if the slave becomes unduly troublesome the slave-owner has the option
of terminating the contract, and few people would choose to kill a person
when  they  have  an  effective  alternative  means  of  being  rid  of  her.
Similarly, a genuine slave-owner wants to acquire a slave rather than her
property.
In  fixed-term voluntary  slavery,  recall,  two  people  agree  a  legally
binding contract in which one person accepts the enforceable duty to live
as directed by the other. To say that it is permissible for there to be such
legally binding contracts is to say that people ought to be permitted to
enter such contracts and enforce them legally, which is to say that such
contracts  ought  to  be  legally  enforceable.  This  does  not  exclude  the
imposition of some paternalistic conditions to be met prior to entry into
such a contract. For example, a prospective slave could be required to
receive a critical challenge, provided by a person trained for the purpose,
the  point  of  which  would  be  to  ensure  that  she  has  considered
alternatives, is familiar with the risks and drawbacks and has strategies
for dealing with them. To avoid any adverse impact on third parties, the
costs of the critical challenge would be charged to the prospective slave.
Further,  legal  provisions  would  be  needed  for  a  range  of  special
circumstances, including children born to slaves; but the various options
for dealing with such circumstances cannot be discussed here.
We can summarise (i) - (iii), as follows: 
(iv) each person has the moral right to experiment with any kind of
life that may possibly fulfil her.
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This right involves the liberty of the person to experiment, expressed
in (i), and the duty of others not to prevent such experimentation by using
a  person  simply  as  a  means  to  promote  the  flourishing  of  others,
expressed  in  (ii).  Like  all  rights,  it  is  subject  to  limitation  by  the
flourishing of others, as reflected in (iii). Given that one of the permissible
ways in  which a person may experiment  is  with  fixed-term voluntary-
slavery contracts, another way of expressing (iv) is: 
(v)  each person has the temporarily alienable moral right to direct
her own life. 
That is to say, each person has the moral right to direct her own life,
unless she alienates that right; but she can alienate that right only for a
fixed term. The fact that a person has the moral right to direct her own
life  unless  she  voluntarily  gives  up  that  right  means  that  compulsory
slavery is impermissible. The fact that she can give up that right means
that voluntary slavery is permissible. The fact that she can give up that
right only for a fixed term means that only voluntary slavery of a non-
paradigmatic  form  is  permissible.  The  permissible  form  of  non-
paradigmatic voluntary slavery is that which is for a fixed period, in which
the slave-owner cannot kill the slave, and in which the slave gives away
all her property before the start of the contract term. These moral rights,
impermissibilities  and  permissibilities  are  grounded  in  the  essential
personal  task of  self-discovery,  the  possibility  of  natural  slaves and of
natural slave-owners, and the trial-and-error process by which we acquire
our always fallible knowledge.
IV. Conclusion
A free person is one who has the legal right to direct his own life.
Slavery is a relationship between persons in which one person has the
legal right to direct the life of another. In compulsory slavery, a person is
enslaved against his will.  In voluntary slavery,  a free person contracts
with another free person that from a specified future time the first person
will have the legal duty to fulfil all the legitimate commands of the second.
The first person thereby ceases to be free and becomes a slave; the second
becomes a slave-owner with the legal right to direct the life of the first. In
paradigmatic voluntary slavery, the slave has the duty to obey the slave-
owner until the slave-owner releases him from that duty; the slave-owner
is  also  entitled  to  kill  the  slave  and to  take  possession of  the  slave’s
property.
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Facts about permissibility and impermissibility depend upon facts
about human flourishing and the separateness of persons. Each person
has the essential personal task of discovering for himself, through trial
and error, which kind of life will fulfil him; though the knowledge thus
gained  is  always  fallible.  This  undergirds  the  right  of  each  person  to
experiment with any kind of life that he conjectures may fulfil him, so
long as it is possible for a person to be fulfilled in that way and so long as
such experimentation does not have substantial adverse impact on other
people’s  flourishing  or  involve  using  anyone  simply  as  a  means.  This
makes  compulsory  slavery  and  paradigmatic  voluntary  slavery
impermissible. However, it is possible that there are natural slaves of (at
least) five different types, for whom the most worthwhile life is that lived
as a slave to another person; and there are permissible slave-owners. It is
therefore permissible for people who conjecture that they may be natural
slaves to experiment with a form of non-paradigmatic voluntary slavery,
provided they can find a permissible slave-owner. In this form of voluntary
slavery, the contract is for a fixed period, the slave-owner has a legal duty
not to kill the slave and, before the start of the contract, the slave has to
give away all his property. People who are convinced that they are natural
slaves will be able to renew their contracts at the end of the fixed term
and continue such renewals until such time as they change their mind (if
they ever do). Thus, each person has the temporarily alienable moral right
to direct his own life; that is, fixed-term voluntary slavery contracts ought
to be legally enforceable. If fixed-term voluntary slavery were thus legally
recognised, we might be surprised at how many people experiment with
slavery as part of their process of self-discovery, and even at how many
appear to be natural slaves.
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